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Abstract
The tax simulation studies in Japan have necessarily relied on arbitrary sets
of preference parameters due to the paucity of the empirical estimates. Motivated
by this state of the art, we estimate the labor supply function and preference
parameters for Japanese prime-age males, allowing for the complex Japanese
income tax system and taking advantage of a large microdata set we obtained for
this study. We employ two versions of the method of maximum likelihood. One
is the celebrated Hausman method which assumes a linear labor supply function
(Hausman 1979). The other is the method proposed by Zabalza (1983), which
takes advantage of an explicit speci￿cation of the CES preferences. We have
examined several estimation patterns and calculated elasticities over the whole
or sub-samples of observations. While the sample averages of uncompensated
elasticities are estimated between 0:06￿0:21, those of compensated counterparts
result in higher ranges (0:08 ￿ 1:39) due to rather large negative estimates for
the income e⁄ects. It may be interesting to point out that the compensated
elasticities tend to be higher in the CES case (0:41 ￿ 1:39) than the Hausman
case (0:08￿1:12) despite the fact that the former is immune from the MaCurdy
critique (MaCurdy et al. 1990).
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11 Introduction
Evaluating market response to taxation has profound implications for assessing public
policy. Since taxes distort an economy to the extent that consumer choices are af-
fected by taxation, designing optimal tax structure requires parameters that describe
how individuals response to tax changes. In addition, if taxes are distortionary, the
marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) may be more than unity, blowing up the ef-
fective cost of an expenditure program more than its nominal value. Given the fact
that labor taxes constitute a majority of tax revenues in most developed countries,
therefore, the estimation of labor supply response to taxation has been a primal focus
of the empirical literature (Pencavel 1986, Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).
In contrast to the rich stock of empirical studies for North America and Europe,
however, few analogous attempts have been made in Japan.1 First, very few of the
Japanese studies properly allow for the e⁄ect of tax system on the budget constraint
of consumers.2 With a progressive taxation system, marginal tax rates on personal
labor income depend on the number of hours worked, which means that after-tax
wage rates are in￿ uenced by the hours of worked. This makes an individual budget
constraint piece-wise linear where each of its segments is identi￿ed with a linear line
de￿ned by the after-tax wage rate ￿the slope ￿and the ￿ virtual income￿￿the intercept
of the linear line extended from that segment. As labor hours vary, both the after-
tax wage rate and the virtual income also vary, which gives rise to the endogeneity
problems in estimating labor supply responses. While this is the standard argument
in the literature, however, typical Japanese studies have not allowed for the issues
that the piece-wise linear budget constraint may raise.3 In addition, a majority
of the Japanese studies employ before-tax, rather than after-tax, wage rate as an
explanatory variable. Since the gross wage elasticity of labor supply makes sense
only when the tax structure does not vary (Blomquist 1988), tax policy evaluation
based on the gross elasticity will be problematic.
Second, little interest has been shown in the labor supply of prime age male
workers in Japan, although they contribute to a substantive part of income tax rev-
enues.4 Given the institutional constraints in the Japanese labor markets, many
Japanese economists tend to question the limitation and unreality of the standard
1Except our own studies, we have found only 21 published studies that estimate the wage e⁄ects
on labour supply. Among them nine studies employed micro-data, while the others utilized data
aggregated either at national or prefectural level. See Bessho and Hayashi (2005) for more.
2Possible exceptions may include Akabayashi (2002) which focuses on female labor supply, not on
that of the prime-age males.
3The argument is well summarized in, for example, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
4Okamoto (1984), Asano (1997), and Yamada et al. (1999) estimated the labor supply of prime-
age males. But their data sets are, however, aggregate and they did not properly consider the e⁄ects
of the tax system. There are very few microdata-based studies with a possible exception of Shimada
and Sakai (1980) who estimate for males under 30 living with their parents. Naito (2003) is another
exception but his sample is also limited.
2leisure-goods choice model.5 They often assume that workers, unable to respond to
wage rate changes by adjusting their labor supply, only either accept or reject the
set of wage and working hours proposed by prospective employers. As such, when
they decide to work, the elasticity of the labor supply along the intensive margin
is zero with the ￿xed working hours.6 This type of modeling is deemed to be even
more suited to prime-age male workers in this country. We know, however, that the
standard labor supply model does not necessarily require workers to freely choose
their working hours for a given value of wage rate (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).
The model can be predicated on an environment where workers pick one pair of wage
rate and labor hours from among those that several possible employers o⁄er. We then
interpret selected pairs as labor supply functions that represent workers￿preferences
over the set of wage rates and working hours.
Third, despite the paucity of the empirical estimates for the Japanese economy,
a series of tax reform simulation has been conducted (Honma et al. 1985, Honma
et al. 1987, Hashimoto et al. 1989, Honma 1991, Yamada 1991, Konishi 1997,
Hashimoto 1998, Uemura 2001). An applied general-equilibrium (AGE) model is set
up to examine the e⁄ects of tax changes by simulating how an exogenous change in
a tax system would disturb an existing equilibrium and yield a new one. Of course,
AGE models need parameters that characterize consumer preferences, which in turn
condition labor responses to the tax change. However, since there seem to be no
reliable estimates for consumer preferences or labor responses, the tax simulation
studies have necessarily relied on arbitrary sets of preference parameters.
Motivated by this state of the art, and taking advantage of the data set obtained
for this study, we estimate the labor supply function and preference parameters for
Japanese prime-age males (age 25 to 55), allowing for the issues discussed above.
In this exercise, we employ the two estimation methods proposed respectively by
Hausman (1979) and Zabalza (1983). Both are what is called ￿ structural￿and take
advantage of the method of maximum likelihood. But they di⁄er in the speci￿ca-
tion of consumer preferences and in the way how the log-likelihood functions are
derived. Note that the structure of our data set precludes other popular methods,
including the IV estimation (e.g., MaCurdy 1981) and the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
(D-in-D) method (e.g., Saez 2003). The current study draws on Syugyo Kozo Kihon
Chosa [Employment Status Survey] conducted in 1997 and 2002. While the survey
is arguably the most comprehensive survey on labor supply with a large number of
observations, labor hours in the survey are coded with intervals for which no point
data are available. Furthermore, the structure of the data is not that of panel data,
5In fact, constraints in labor markets are pointed out in other countries too. For example, Kimball
and Shapiro (2003) discuss the constraints on labor hours imposed by the employers, and the di⁄er-
ence between the observed wage and the shadow wage implicit in a long-term relationship between
￿rms and workers.
6For this type of reasoning, see Higuchi and Hayami (1984).
3with di⁄erent samples surveyed over time. These limitations make the applications
of the IV and D-in-D methods less straightforward, and leave us the two methods
that utilizes the ML estimation which readily allows for the data set with interval
data, as we shall show in this study.
While the two methods share a common basis in that they utilize the ML method
and explicitly take account of both the consumer preferences and the tax system in
place, Zabalza￿ s method seems to have been less popular than Hausman￿ s. However,
the method, which speci￿es consumers￿preferences as a CES form, may have several
advantages. First, it is less ￿ computationally demanding￿since the CES speci￿cation
yields a much simpler ML function. Second, the method well conforms to the existing
tax simulation studies, since such simulations frequently specify consumer preference
as a CES form. With the method by Zabalza, therefore, we could lend an empirical
basis to the tax simulations which was once based upon the arbitrary choice of the
decisive parameters.
We examine several estimation patterns and calculate the wage elasticities of labor
over the whole or sub-samples of observations. To anticipate the results, we will show
that the uncompensated (Marshallian) elasticities are estimated to range between
0:06 ￿ 0:21 on average. Along with a rather large income e⁄ects, the compensated
(Hicksian) counterparts resulted in higher ranges (0:08 ￿ 1:39), which tend to be
higher in the CES case (0:41 ￿ 1:39) than the Hausman case (0:08 ￿ 1:12). This
result may be interesting since the former case is immune from the MaCurdy critique
(MaCurdy 1990).
Our exercise, of course, has several caveats. First, our model is static. While the
literature has also examined intertemporal models of labor supply, however, such an
intertemporal study demands more information than that is available for the current
study. For example, the model based on the two-stage budgeting requires information
on individual assets or on individual consumption (MaCurdy 1983). In addition, the
estimation of Frisch labor supply function requires us to allow for individual ￿xed
e⁄ects, which typically presumes a panel structure of the data (MaCurdy 1981). We
are thus limited to examining the intratemporal elasticity based on a static model.
Second, our intent is to estimate a base-line model that may conveniently be used
for tax simulation studies. Of course, workers may not have a perfect knowledge of
tax structure and do not maximize their utility without evading or avoiding taxes.
A household is not a unitary actor, and there may be important interactions among
family members. While allowing for these realistic assumptions is important,7 but
doing so should constitute a topic for another paper. Third, while there are several
dimensions of workers￿response to wage changes, we only consider intensive margins.
Workers decide whether to enter the labor force (extensive margin), and change their
7See Gemmell et al. (2004) for the ￿scal illusion and Brett (1988) for the intrafamily resource
allocation.
4hours worked and/or the intensity of their work (intensive margin).8 While we are
aware that distinguishing between these two margins is important,9 we focus on the
intensive margin for this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section 2) extends the two
models originally invented by Hausman and Zabalza and derives the two types of
log-likelihood functions that are adjusted for our data structure. In Section 3, we
explain our sample, data set and the construction of the key variables. Section 4
provides the estimates and discusses implications. Section 5 then concludes.
2 Method
2.1 Linear Labor Supply
Since the Hausman method is explained elsewhere, we simply provides its basic as-
sumptions and the modi￿cations our data necessitates. The Hausman method starts
with a linear labor supply function in level:
hi = ￿wi + ￿yi + Zi￿ + ui (1)
where hi is hours worked, wi is net wage rate, yi is the virtual income, Zi is a vector of
observable individual characteristics, and ui is error term. Note that, due to di⁄erent
marginal tax rates under the progressive tax system, the price of leisure (i.e., net-
of-tax wage rate) changes discontinuously, depending on individual consumption of
leisure (L ￿ hi where L is the time endowment). This makes the budget line kinked
and piece-wise linear. For a given segment of the budget line, the constraint is linearly
expressed as
xi = wi ￿ hi + yi (2)
where wi = w(Yi;Mi;Wi) = (1 ￿ m(Yi;Mi))Wi and yi = y(Yi;Mi). Wi is gross
wage rate and Yi ￿ Wihi is earned income. Expressions m(Yi;Mi) and y(Yi;Mi)
associates marginal tax rate m and virtual income y of individual i with his income
Yi = Wihi and his household characteristics Mi that a⁄ect tax deductions and credits
(and may be di⁄erent from Zi). As such, wi and yi are constructed with wage and
no-labor income data combined with a detailed examination of the tax codes.
The error term is decomposed as ui = ￿i + "i where ￿i is unobserved di⁄erence
in preferences that is not explained by Zi, and "i is other unspeci￿ed type of error
that include optimization errors by consumers as well as measurement errors by
8There are additional dimensions of consumer responses if the wage change is caused by changes in
taxes. Tax avoidance and evasion are prime examples. Several studies therefore focus on estimating
the elasticity of taxable income, rather than labor supply. See, for example, Auten and Carroll (1999)
and Gruber and Saez (2002).
9See, for example, Saez (2002) and Bhattarai and Whalley (2003).
5observers. These two components are independently distributed with ￿i ￿ N(0;￿2
￿)
and "i ￿ N(0;￿2
"). With the de￿nition vi ￿ "i + ￿i ￿ N(0;￿2
v), the correlation




The progressive labor income taxation makes consumer￿ s budget constraint piece-
wise linear. Let h￿
1;:::;h￿
J￿1 be labor supply on which the budget kinks. Segment
j de￿nes a linear line with a set of net wage rate and virtual income (wj;yj) for
j = 1;2;:::;J. With gj ￿ ￿wj + ￿yj + Z￿, labor supply h is characterized as
h =
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J￿1 < gJ + ￿:
:
where index i is suppressed.
We can then assign the probability for each of the events. Recall that our data do
not contain a point value h but an interval [hL;hH]: we only observe whether or not
h 2 [hL;hH]. This requires us to depart from the standard Hausman method and to
derive the probability of h falling in a given interval:
Pr[hL < gj + ￿ + " < hH;h￿










































where ￿(x1;x2;￿) is a joint cumulative distribution of two random variables x1 and
x2 that are drawn from the standard normal distribution with correlation coe¢ cient
￿. The probability that the observed value of h with its optimal part (h￿) on a kink
point (h￿ = hL) falls between [hL, hH] is:
Pr[hL < h￿
j + " < hH;gj+1 + ￿ < h￿
j < gj + ￿]
= Pr[hL ￿ h￿
j < " < hH ￿ h￿
j;h￿









































where ￿(￿) is the cumulative standard normal distribution. With these two types of
probability de￿ned over the observations, we can construct the ML function of our
sample to estimate parameters ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿v, and ￿￿.
62.2 CES Utility Function
The method proposed by Zabalza (1983) starts by assuming that the preferences of





i + ￿i ￿ (T ￿ hi)￿￿
￿￿ 1
￿ ; (3)
where xi is the composite good as numeraire, hi is labor supply, and ￿ > ￿1 is the
parameter that represents the elasticity of substitution. The weight ￿i is determined
by personal characteristics Zi (vector) and a random component ￿i as:
￿i ￿ exp(Zi￿ ￿ ￿i); (4)
where e is the base of the natural logarithm, and ￿ is a corresponding coe¢ cient
vector. Note that ￿i > 0 by construction. With the linearly approximated piece-wise




T ￿ [w(Wihi;Mi)=exp(Zi￿ ￿ ￿i)]
1
1+￿ ￿ y(Wihi;Mi)




which is a fairly complex function to estimate.
Zabalza (1983) skips the direct estimation of (5) for estimating parameters in (3),
taking advantage of the CES form of (3). In addition, we can extend his method to
forego directly observing h￿
i to obtain the parameters with interval-coded labor hour
data as follows.






















i are the optimal leisure and numeraire good consumptions. For an
arbitrary level of hours worked h, we obtain the marginal tax rate m(Wihi;Mi)
and the virtual income y(Wihi;Mi), and corresponding levels of consumption x ￿
(1 ￿ m(Wihi;Mi))Y + y(Wihi;Mi) and leisure li ￿ T ￿ Y=Wi. Then, for a given
interval of labor hours [hiL, hiH] with subscripts iH and iL respectively denoting the













where xij ￿ (1￿m(Wihij;Mi))Wjhij +y(Wihij;Mi) and lij ￿ T ￿hij for j = L;H.





























































where wiL ￿ (1 ￿ m(WihiL;Mi))Wi. With (4), we show that the probability of



































which is a contribution to the likelihood function we use to estimate parameters
f￿;￿g. In particular, if we assume that ￿ ￿ N(0;￿2


















where L(￿) is the likelihood function and ￿(￿) is the cumulative distribution function
of normally distributed random variable ￿. Since xij ￿ (1 ￿ m(Wihij;Mi))Wihij +
y(Wihij;Mi), lj ￿ T ￿ hij and wij ￿ (1 ￿ m(Wihij;Mi))Wi for j = L;H, we use
the above log-likelihood to obtain ML estimates of preference parameters f￿;￿g with
interval coded labor hours [hiL;hiH]. More speci￿cally, for a given values of ￿ and ￿,
we can quantify (6) with data for wage rate Wi, personal characteristics Zi, marginal
tax rate mij, and virtual income yij. The latter two are calculated for a given interval
[hiL;hiH], with reference to the tax schedule and the relevant household information
Mi.
3 Data sets
3.1 Data and variables
The data used in our samples are obtained from Syugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa [Em-
ployment Status Survey] by the Statistical Bureau of the Japanese Government in
81997 and 2002. This survey is conducted every ￿ve years and arguably the most
comprehensive labor survey in Japan, which contains about 11 million individual
observations with a variety of household characteristics. Our focus is on the labor
supply of prime age (25-55) males who are also classi￿ed as the head with non-
working spouse. We further excluded observations with the following characteristics:
(a) self-employed workers, (b) board￿ s members of private companies or non-pro￿t or-
ganizations, (c) family workers for SMEs, (d) the unemployed due to illness, (e) those
who had changed residence or job within one year, and (f) those who had children
within one year. We also excluded those with non-labor income since the survey does
not provide the point value for that variable (therefore the sample consists of those
only with labor income). These omissions reduce the sample size down to 73,713 in
1997 and 63,703 in 2002.
Tables 1a and 1b show the summary statistics for 1997 and 2002. The labor
supply (dependent variable) is measured as annual hours worked for a given year.
The independent variables are standard and consist of after-tax (net) wage, virtual
income, age, age squared, the number of children below 15 years old, and the number
of dependents other than said children. The net wage is calculated as a product of
gross wage and one minus marginal tax rate. Recall that hours worked is coded with
intervals in the survey, which make it impossible to obtain gross wage as a ratio of
income to hours worked as in the standard studies. Therefore, we followed Shimada
and Sakai (1980) to construct gross wage data from Chingin Kozo Kihon Tokei Chosa
[Basic Survey on Wage Structure] and match them with the observations used in our
sample. Speci￿cally, we constructed a tabulation of average gross wages sorted by (a)
sex, (b) educational background, (c) age, and (d) place of living (47 prefectures), and
assign them with the observations that share the same combination of the four types
of characterizations. The marginal tax rate and virtual income are calculated with a
close examination of the Japanese tax codes in 1997 and 2002 as we see below. Recall
that we excluded observations with non-labor income. Therefore, variations in virtual
income only come from those in gross wages (Wi) as well as household characteristics
(Mi) that a⁄ect exemptions and credits for personal income and payroll taxes. Other
dependent variables (age, the number of children below 15 years old, and the number
of other dependents) are obtained from the survey.
3.2 The tax system
Three types of taxes are imposed on personal income in Japan: (i) ￿ Income Tax￿by the
national government (national income tax), (ii) ￿ Inhabitants Taxes￿by preferctures
and municipalities10 (local income taxes), and (iii) social security contributions to
10The amounts of inhabitants taxes are calculated based on the income in the previous year in
practice. However, we assume away complications this entails.
9social security funds (payroll taxes)11. The details of the tax system for 1997 and
2002 are described in Table 2.
The tax rates apply to ￿ taxable income.￿ Taxable income is obtained by sub-
stracting from annual gross wages a series of deductions and allowances, which in-
clude ￿ employment income deduction,￿social security deductions, basic allowance and
other allowances for spouse and dependents. The amount of employment income de-
duction regressively deducts certain percentages of gross wages as seen in Table 2.
The social security contributions (pay roll taxes) are all deducted too. The basic
allowance applies to all households. The allowances for spouse are applicable if the
taxpayer￿ s spouse earns income under a certain level. Allowances are also made for
dependents. Such dependends, for example, include children aged between 16 and 23
that do not work. The summary of those deductions and allowances is provided in
the table. The deductions and allowances di⁄er as individual characteristics di⁄er.
In other words, deductions and allowances have to be de￿ned on individual basis.
We only consider the household characteristics we can obtain from the survey. The
data from individual observation allow us to calculate basic allowance, allowances for
spouse, allowance for dependents, employment income deduction and deduction for
social insurance premiums.
Tax rates are progressive12. The determinants of the e⁄ective marginal tax rates
consist of statutory tax rates of the national and local income taxes, employment
income deduction rates and social insurance premium rates. For example, the possible
pairs of statutory rates of the two income taxes yeild nine combined rates in 1997:
0%, 5%, 15%, 20%, 30%, 35%, 45%, 55%, and 64%. In addition to these, there are
proprotional payroll tax rates that depend on the type of employers for social security
contributions. Thus there are 8 kinks in the piece-wise linear budget constraint in
1997. With the introduction of the system of proportional tax credit and the changes
in the tax system, the analogous number of the kink points nine in 2002. Since the
system of employment income deduction generates additional ￿ve kink points, the
number of kink points in the budget constraint is 13 in 1997 and 14 in 2002, although
the upper kinks may not be realized if gross wage rates are too low.
11We assume public pension insurance, public health insurance and public unemployment insurance
as social insurance. The premiums of social insurance di⁄er as places of work di⁄ers. The data does
not contain, however, such information needed to calculate social insurance premium. We assume
that the social insurance premium is 13.325% if the ￿rm where the individual works employs less
than 1000 people, 14.306% if more than 1000 people, 12.9395% if the individual is a public servant,
in 1997 (as of 2002, the rates are 11.29, 12.568 and 11.09, respectively). In addition, special payroll
tax are applied for bonus in 1997. We ignore the upper limit of the social insurance premium.
12The tax rates of inhabitants tax shown in Table are based on ￿standard tax rates￿ . Prefectures
and municipalities are able to change these tax rates in principle, but in practice, almost all local
governments employ the standard tax rates for inhabitants tax.
103.3 Elasticities
We evaluate labor supply responses in elasticity form. The uncompensated wage
elasticity of labor supply ￿i, income e⁄ect ￿i, and compensated wage elasticity of
labor supply ￿c




i = ￿i ￿ ￿i



















i = ￿i ￿ ￿i:
Two problems arise in calculating the elasticities. First, we do not have point
data for hi since our data for the hours worked are coded as intervals. In addition,
the ￿tted values for hi are not readily available as in the standard case of the interval
regression, since wi and yi depends on hi. We cope with this problem through picking
up the largest value of consumer utility. Since each segment of the piece-wise linear
budget constraint for individual i is associated with a pair of after-tax wage rate wi
and virtual income yi, we can see how individual indirect utility varies depending on
the choice of the pair13. By construction, the optimal consumption-labor choice is
given by the pair (or segment) that yields the highest value of the utility function.
With the pair (wi, yi) thus identi￿ed, we obtain a point estimate for hi, which allows
us to calculate elasticities. We also allow for the preference heterogeneity by drawing
￿ or ￿ from a random number generator for normal distribution with zero mean and
estimated standard error, and adding those values to the above point estimates for
the labor hours.14
13For the linear labor supply case, the indirect utility is obtained as












with the labor supply functions hi = ￿wi + ￿yi + Zi￿ + ￿i. For the CES case, with labor supply
hi = (T(wi=￿i)
1
1+￿ ￿ yi)=wi + (wi=￿i)
1











14Note that the assumption about measurement error make variance of estimated working hours
11Second, it is not straightforward to de￿ne the wage elasticities of labor supply
at the kink points.15 Common wage rates cannot be de￿ned, nor can elasticities,
at the kink points. To circumvent the problem, we take advantage of the fact that
elasticities are mechanically de￿ned once net-wage rates, quantities of labor supply
and numeraire good are available. We then arti￿cially de￿ne a psuedo-elasticity that
utilizes a pair of labor supply and the numeraire along with the net wage rate of the
￿ next￿segment.16
4 Results
4.1 Linear Labor Supply
Table 3 lists the main estimation results. The coe¢ cients on after-tax wage rate and
virtual income have expected signs and are all statistically signi￿cant at the standard
levels of signi￿cance. The absolute values of the coe¢ cients are are larger in 2002
than those in 1997. Including educational backgrounds as additional explanatory
variables increases the absolute values and the changes are more conspicuous for
for the after-tax wage rate. The number of young kids a⁄ects positively and the
number of speci￿c dependent children have negative e⁄ects on hours worked. The
standard deviations of preference heterogeneity (￿￿) and observation error (￿v) are
also statistically signi￿cant. Given the standard error for the ￿ ￿tted values￿we will
see in Table 4, these two values suggest that there are larger variations that are
unexplained by the structural component.
The elasticities based on Table 3 are listed in Table 4. The average values of
the uncompensated elasticities range from :059 to :178. Along with the range for
the income e⁄ects between ￿:321 and ￿:637, the average values of the compensated
elasticities range from :379 to :815. The compensated labor supply elasticities are
estimated larger, by more than :1, with the speci￿cation that includes educational
backgrounds as explanatroy variables. In each case, the magnitude of substitution
and income e⁄ects are both large, but they are cancelled out to yeild rather reasonable
values for the Marshallian elasticities. For example, the uncompensated elasticity of
:1 means that working hours of a worker, who works 2;500 hours per year and receive
3;000 yen per hour (that is, her annual earnings is 7:5 million yen), increase only 2:5
hours per year when her hourly wage increase by 1% (her annual earnings increase
7;500 yen). While we are focusing on the intensive margin, these small values are
consistent with previous studies.
In addition, we estimated the labor supply function with subsamples categorized
smaller than that of actual hours.
15As noted above, our data for the hours worked are coded intervals. This make it impossible to
verify actual labor supply is near kink points.
16We are thus considering the case where labor supply increases a little bit from a given kink point.
12by employment status. Table 5 shows the results. For the permanent workers, the
uncompensated elasticities are less than :100. And both the compensated elasticity
and the income e⁄ect are smaller than those obtained from the whole sample in
Table 4. For supply workers, the sample-average elasticities are much larger than
those for permanent workers, which may naturally be expected. The sample variance
of the uncompensated elasticities are also larger, which may be due to the fact that
the virtual income is statistically insigni￿cant with the large standard error. For
daily-workers, the coe¢ cient on the virtual income is negative on average. Given the
average value for the uncompensated elasticity, this means that the Slutsky condition
is not satis￿ed on average with the negative value of the average uncompensated
elasticity. Noting that the coe¢ cient on virtual income is not statistically signi￿cant,
this results may be due to the small sample size and/or speci￿cation errors.
We also examined the subsamples categorized by educational backgrounds. Ta-
ble 6a shows the results for the 1997 data. While the coe¢ cients on after-tax wage
rate are all statistically signi￿cant with expected signs, those on virtual income are
statistically insigni￿cant for the subsamples other than 4-year college graduates, and
has an unexpected sign for 2-year college graduates. On the other hand, in Table 6b
which lists the results from the 2002 data, we see expected signs on after-tax wage and
virtual income which are all statistically signi￿cant. Comparing high school gradu-
ates with 4-year college graduates, both of which have larger sample sizes (more than
20;000), we see that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of college grad-
uates are larger than those of high school graduates. In particular, the compensated
elasticity of college graduates in 2002 is more than 1.17
4.2 CES Utility Function
For the CES case, we do not directly estimate the labor supply function. Instead,
paramters of the utility function in a CES form as (3) and (4) are estimated to be
utilized to obtain the elasticities. Table 7 lists the estimation results. Columns 1
and 4 do not allow for individual characteristics as controls (i.e., ￿ is constant over
observations). The other columns do allow for di⁄erent combinations of the controls,
which all exhibit statistical signi￿cance. The number of children under 14 years of age
has a negative e⁄ect on the leisure weight, while the number of ￿ speci￿c￿dependents
has a positive e⁄ect. The e⁄ects of junior high school graduation are estimated to
be negative. These results are consistent with the case of the linear labor supply
function.
The parameter ￿ represents the elasticity of substitution and falls within the range
of ￿:148 to :011. Note that the CES utility function approaches the linear utility
17This may be counterintuitive since college graduates in Japan may tend to be thought as being
employed in large established companies where labor hours are rather inelastic to wages. These small
elasticities may be due to relatively small variations of the wage rate of college graduates.
13function if ￿ ! ￿1, and the Cobb-Douglas form if if ￿ ! 0.
Table 8 shows the average elasticities based on the results in Table 7. The average
uncompensated elasticities range from :138 to :211 along with the average income
e⁄ects of around ￿:79, which together yeilds the average compensated elasticities
which range from :9 to 1:0. These compensated elacticities are higher than analogous
values for the linear labor supply function case. However, the uncompensated values
are still rather small.
We also conducted subsample estimation that is analogous to the linear function
case. Table 9 shows the results by the employment status. The compensated elastici-
ties are quite large being in the vicinity of unity. Still, the values are relatively smaller
for permanent workers, an analogous result we obtained for the linear labor supply
function case. Tables 10a and 10b show the results for the subsamples categorized by
the educational backgrounds. The substitution and income e⁄ects do not vary very
much among the di⁄erent education backgrounds. The values of the uncompensated
elasticities, ranging from :15 to :25, are similar to or somewhat larger than those
obtained in the other case.
4.3 Comparison
We have found that the elasticities di⁄er depending on the speci￿cation18. We con-
sider the di⁄erence more closely, examining the case of 2002. The results are compared
in Table 11. Note that we assume away the preference heterogeneity in the linear
labor supply so that the results of the two types of estimation comparable. As such,
the ￿gures are slightly di⁄erent from those in Table 4 and 8 that allow for random
variables (￿ and ￿) in calculating the elasticities.
The CES speci￿cation yeilds more elastic response, but the predictions two models
replicate are quite similar. We calculated the ￿ ￿tted￿values for the average tax rates,
the marginal tax rates, the hours worked and net wage rates. As the table shows, the
average values of these are quite similar. The standard deviations are also similar
except that the variations of the predicted hours worked are larger for the CES case
than those for the linear case. In addition, the correlation of the pair of predicted
values is high.
Since di⁄erent values for labor supply are used for the pair of elasticities, this
may have caused the CES speci￿cation to yield more elastic response. However, the
di⁄erence in the preference speci￿cations may be more important. Figure 2 shows the
indi⁄erence curves of the two speci￿cations based on the parameters in Table 3 and
7. The parameter values are such that the two indi⁄erence curves ￿ single-cross￿at a
given bundle, with the curve for the CES case being steeper. Therefore, for a given
bundle, one unit of leisure is evaluated higher in the CES case than in the linear case,
18As is pointed out in the literature (Pencavel 1986, MaCurdy et. al 1990, Ekl￿f and Sacklen
2000), the Hausman method in general has produced larger uncompensated wage e⁄ects.
14suggesting that the substitution e⁄ects for the CES case are larger. The di⁄erence
might be due to the restrictions that the two speci￿cations a priori impose.
In both cases, while the uncompensated elasticites are estimated relatively low,
high negative values of the income e⁄ects make the compensated elasticites rather
large. The celebrated MaCurdy critique (MaCurdy et al. 1990) may then apply here.
The criticism argues that since the ML function for the Hausman method allows for
the kink points in the budget constraint, restrictions are built in the estimation so
that larger labor responses are obtained. However, it may be interesting to note that
the CES case, which yeilded even larger responses, does not have to allow for such
kink points.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have estimated the labor supply function of prime age males in
Japan. Our contributions may be summarized as follows. First, our attempt should
be the ￿rst attempt to estimate the labor responses of Japanese prime age males that
allows for the consumer budget that allows for the details of the Japanese progressive
income tax system. Second, we have utilized the method by Zabalza (1983) that
takes advantage of the CES speci￿cation of consumer preferences, in addition to the
standard Hausman method. The parameters estimated for the CES preferences may
be utilized for tax simulation studies. Third, given that our dependent variable is
coded as interval, we have extended the existing two methods to specify the two
maximum likelihood functions that allow for the interval data. Fourth, based on the
estimates and the data, we have calculated wage elasticities of labor supply for the
two speci￿cations, i.e., a linear labor supply of the Hausman method and the CES
speci￿cation of the Zabalza method. In the base-line model, the sample averages for
uncompensated elasticites range from 0:06 to 0:18 with the linear speci￿cation, and
from 0:14 to 0:21 with the CES speci￿cation. However, with high negative values of
the income e⁄ects, the compensated elasticites turns out to be rather large, ranging
from 0:38 to 0:82 with the linear speci￿cation and from 0:93 to 1:00 with the CES
speci￿cation. The celebrated MaCurdy crisism attributes larger labor responses to
the ML function that allows for the kink points in the consumer￿ s budget constraint.
It then may be interesting to note that the CES case, which yeilded larger responses,
does not have to allow for the kink points to obtain its ML estimates.
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Table 1a: Sample statistics, 1997 
 Average  S.  D.  max  min 
Before-tax wage rate  0.281 0.087 0.087 0.613 
Hours worked (lower end)  1387.3 376.2  0  2142.9 
Hours worked (upper end)  2460.8 1256.9  107.1  5840 
Age  42.470 8.029  25  55 
# of kids younger than 15  0.879 1.005  0  7 
# of Specific dependent children  0.275 0.554  0  4 
Junior high school  0.139 0.346  0  1 
High school  0.489 0.500  0  1 
2-year college  0.062 0.240  0  1 
4-year college, graduate school  0.310 0.463  0  1 









Table 1b: Sample statistics, 2002 
 Average  S.  D.  max  min 
Before-tax wage rate  0.266  0.090  0.072  0.591 
Hours worked (lower end)  1450.9  401.8 0  2142.9 
Hours worked (upper end)  2659.7  1427.4  107.1  5840 
Age  42.794  8.191 25 55 
# of kids younger than 15  0.949  1.002 0 6 
# of Specific dependent children  0.270  0.557 0 4 
Junior high school  0.105  0.307 0 1 
High  school  0.473  0.499 0 1 
2-year  college  0.080  0.271 0 1 
4-year college, graduate school  0.342  0.474  0  1 
(Note) Sample size is 63,703. 
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Table 2: Outline of income taxation system 
(Thousand yen) 
 1997  2002 
  Income tax  Inhabitants tax  Income tax  Inhabitants tax 
Basic allowance  380  330  380  330 
Allowance for spouses  380  330  380  330 
Special allowance for spouses  380  330  380  330 
Allowance for dependents  380  330  380  330 
Allowance for specific dependents  530  410  630  450 
Not over 1,800, 
40% 
Not over 1,800, 
40% 
Not over 1,800, 
40% 
Not over 1,800, 
40% 
Employment income deduction 
Not over 3,600, 
30% 
Not over 3,600, 
30% 
Not over 3,600, 
30% 
Not over 3,600, 
30% 
 Not  over  6,600, 
20% 
Not over 6,600, 
20% 
Not over 6,600, 
20% 
Not over 6,600, 
20% 
 Not  over  10,000, 
10% 
Not over 10,000, 
10% 
Not over 10,000, 
10% 
Not over 10,000, 
10% 
  Over 10,000, 5% Over 10,000, 5% Over 10,000, 5%  Over 10,000, 5%
Lower limit  650  650  650  650 
Tax rate  Not over 3,300, 
10% 
Not over 2,000, 
5% 
Not over 3,300, 
10% 
Not over 2,000, 
5% 
 Over  3,300,   
20% 
Over 2,000,   
10% 
Over 3,300, 20%  Over 2,000,   
10% 
 Over  9,000,   
30% 
Over 7,000,   
15% 
Over 9,000,   
30% 
Over 7,000,   
13% 
 Over  18,000, 
40% 
 Over  18,000,   
37% 
 
 Over  30,000, 
50% 
   
Payroll tax rate (small firm)  13.325%  -  11.29%  - 
Payroll tax rate (large firm)  14.306%  -  12.568%  - 
Payroll tax rate (public servant)  12.9395%  -  11.09%  - 
   20%  15%  Proportional tax credit 
    Upper limit: 250  Upper limit: 40
 
(Note) Special payroll tax rates for bonus are applied in 1997 for employees of private companies. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results: Linear Labor Supply Function 
 1997   1997   2002    2002  
After-tax wage rate  400.901 
*** 1070.525 
*** 952.910  
***  1342.749 
***
  (75.08)   (104.15)   (96.71)      (110.45)  
Virtual income  -1.344 
*** -1.488 
*** -2.518  
***  -2.806 
***
  (0.18)   (0.21)   (0.30)      (0.31)  
Age 3.024    0.693    13.329   
***  13.205 
***
  (2.60)   (2.66)   (3.25)      (3.30)  
Age^2 -0.127 
*** -0.142 
*** -0.257  
***  -0.278 
***
  (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.04)      (0.04)  
# of kids younger than 15  9.099 
*** 8.228 
*** 10.119  
***  9.659 
***
  (2.12)   (2.16)   (2.67)      (2.71)  
# of Specific dependent children  -16.294 
*** -18.298 
*** -11.087  
**  -10.114 
** 
  (3.52)   (3.63)   (4.34)      (4.41)  
Junior high school    124.420 
***  
  123.192 
***
    (6.33)      (8.03)  
2-year  college    -0.628      0.903  
    (7.85)      (8.62)  
4-year college    -27.138 
***  
  -5.539 
 
    (6.51)        (7.52)   
Constant  1767.852 
*** 1748.732 
*** 1560.738  
***  1521.834 
***
  (50.28)    (51.19)    (63.25)    (64.18)   
σθ  330.835 
*** 330.845 
*** 343.862  
***  336.471 
***
  (16.12)    (14.78)    (16.28)    (14.98)   
σν  250.229 
*** 255.041 
*** 325.658  
***  334.372 
***
  (20.01)   (18.04)   (15.47)      (13.18)  
# of observation  73712   73697   63717    63703  
Log Likelihood  -73666.7  -73447.5   -68266.2    -68126.0  
(Note) Figures in parentheses shows standard error. - 25 - 
Table 4: Estimated Elasticity: Linear Labor Supply Function 
   Average S.  D.  max  min 
1997, without education variables       
  η  0.059 0.024 0.013 0.396 
  φ  -0.321  0.104 -0.824 -0.090 
  ηc  0.379 0.125 0.105 1.039 
1997, with education variables   
  η  0.157 0.064 0.035 0.811 
  φ  -0.355  0.115 -0.912 -0.100 
  ηc  0.512 0.172 0.142 1.548 
2002, without education variables   
  η  0.126 0.052 0.025 0.692 
  φ  -0.572  0.199 -1.445 -0.140 
  ηc  0.698 0.244 0.168 1.817 
2002, with education variables   
  η  0.178 0.072 0.033 0.900 
  φ  -0.637  0.221 -1.610 -0.157 
  ηc  0.815 0.285 0.195 2.136 
 - 26 - 
Table 5a: Estimation Results: Linear Labor Supply Function, 1997 
 Permanent
work    Supply 
work    Daily- 
workers   
After-tax wage rate  242.554 
***  3215.131 
**  1914.118  
* 
 (72.06)  (1510.64)  (1082.24)   
Virtual income  -1.075 
***  -6.828 5.775   
* 
 (0.17)  (5.18)  (3.47)   
Age 3.932  -8.316  -71.276   
* 
 (2.57)  (73.22)  (38.24)   
Age^2 -0.134 
***  0.121 0.710   
 (0.03)  (0.89)  (0.46)   
# of kids younger than 15  8.726 
***  96.520 48.717   
 (2.09)  (60.66)  (32.79)   
# of Specific dependent children  -16.681 
***  82.045 120.132   
* 
 (3.47)  (119.68)  (63.07)   
Constant  1768.856 
***  1151.652 2776.447   
  (49.72) (1413.27)  (749.28)   
σθ  318.847 
***  695.042 
***  153.310  
  (19.13) (57.52) (129.89)   
σν  256.939 
***  57.260 424.613   
*** 
 (22.38)  (87.23)  (60.26)   
# of observation  73290 170 252 
Log Likelihood  -73000.5 -242.1 -310.6 
η  0.036 0.447  0.133   
  (0.01) (1.01)  (0.33)   
φ  -0.257 -0.901  0.859   
  (0.08) (0.36)  (0.26)   
ηc  0.292 1.348 -0.726   
  (0.10) (1.12)  (0.26)   
(Note) Figures in parentheses show standard error. - 27 - 
Table 5b: Estimation Results: Linear Labor Supply Function, 2002 
 Permanent 
work    Supply 
work    Daily- 
workers   
After-tax wage rate  604.384 
*** 3168.541 
**  357.449  
 (92.69)  (1324.17)  (872.02)   
Virtual income  -1.711 
*** -7.938 2.508   
 (0.28)  (5.56)  (5.79)   
Age 15.363 
*** -24.279 4.051   
 (3.18)  (45.37)  (33.03)   
Age^2 -0.275 
*** 0.238 -0.110   
 (0.04)  (0.54)  (0.40)   
# of kids younger than 15  9.884 
*** 45.971 28.647   
 (2.61)  (40.32)  (31.25)   
# of Specific dependent children  -10.622 
**  -38.552 65.424   
 (4.21)  (77.69)  (49.22)   
Constant  1559.633 
*** 1789.322 
**  1551.618  
** 
  (62.06) (904.69) (667.31)   
σθ  337.345 
*** 675.224 
*** 190.410  
  (21.26) (43.43)  (248.44)   
σν  320.199 
*** 137.091 430.521   
***
 (20.96)  (135.23)  (114.77)   
# of observation  62897 406 414 
Log Likelihood  -67030.0 -609.8 -517.7 
η  0.081 0.321 0.004   
  (0.03) (0.58) (0.00)   
φ  -0.391 -0.801  0.263   
  (0.13) (0.34) (0.09)   
ηc  0.472 1.122  -0.259   
  (0.16) (0.70) (0.09)   
(Note) Figures in parentheses show standard error. - 28 - 
 
Table 6a: Estimation Results: Linear Labor Supply Function 1997 














After-tax wage rate  1029.197 
*** 602.610 
*** 800.038  
***  1436.949 
***
 (267.77)  (107.71)  (288.11)      (200.67) 
Virtual income  -0.173  -0.002  0.571      -2.363 
***
 (0.68)  (0.19)  (0.46)      (0.35) 
Age -10.860  -1.344  -5.677      9.794 
 (6.92)  (3.46)  (10.09)      (6.00) 
Age^2 -0.025  -0.102 
**  -0.101  
  -0.247 
***
 (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.12)      (0.07) 
# of kids younger than 15  9.275  6.374 
**  2.866  
  8.767 
** 
 (6.48)  (2.92)  (7.85)      (4.09) 
# of Specific dependent children  -1.319  -25.032 
*** -22.363  
  -16.391 
** 
 (9.17)  (4.73)  (15.10)      (7.69) 
Constant  2129.439 
*** 1818.147 
*** 1933.178  
***  1481.696 
***
  (142.63) (66.40) (183.54)      (112.05) 
σθ  386.580 
*** 405.218 
*** 402.566  
***  323.883 
***
  (44.58) (3.13)  (9.46)      (15.31) 
σν  178.000 
*  3.597 16.579      274.213 
 (94.24)  (4.89)  (44.86)      (13.96) 
# of observation  10221 36061 4538    22877
Log Likelihood  -10198.0 -36379.4 -4490.1    -22332.8
η  0.115 0.082  0.039      0.270 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04)      (0.10) 
φ  -0.032 0.000  0.127      -0.728 
  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.03)      (0.20) 
ηc  0.146 0.082 -0.088      0.998 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05)      (0.29) 
(Note) Figures in parentheses shows standard error. - 29 - 
 
Table 6b: Estimation Results: Linear Labor Supply Function 2002 














After-tax wage rate  2320.557 
***  757.585 
*** 1054.992  
***  1524.666 
***
 (376.22)  (135.08)  (273.37)      (200.84) 
Virtual income  -3.605 
*  -1.345 
**  -1.184  
*  -2.677 
***
 (1.85)  (0.52)  (0.65)      (0.47) 
Age 0.869  12.697 
*** 22.059  
**  16.456 
** 
 (10.27)  (4.38)  (11.03)      (6.73) 
Age^2 -0.161  -0.245 
*** -0.415  
***  -0.349 
***
 (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.13)      (0.08) 
# of kids younger than 15  15.229  9.051 
**  3.472     11.131 
** 
 (10.74)  (3.74)  (8.90)      (4.81) 
# of Specific dependent children  -6.225  -16.267 
*** -5.533     3.222 
 (13.63)  (5.87)  (17.34)      (8.17) 
Constant  1814.591 
***  1561.668 
*** 1426.252  
***  1448.140 
***
  (211.59) (85.34)  (204.97)      (129.15) 
σθ  111.101 453.224 
*** 491.774  
***  309.608 
***
  (237.38) (17.68) (10.08)      (20.13) 
σν  462.336 
***  127.825 
*  1.392     348.073 
***
 (50.22)  (66.47)  (4.15)      (13.21) 
# of observation  6716 30152 5073   21762
Log Likelihood  -7212.8  -32929.8  -5472.8      -22465.2 
η  0.209 0.091 0.135      0.262 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)      (0.08) 
φ  -0.583 -0.258 -0.245      -0.804 
  (0.13) (0.06) (0.06)      (0.21) 
ηc  0.792 0.349 0.380      1.066 
  (0.17) (0.09) (0.12)      (0.28) 
(Note) Figures in parentheses shows standard error. - 30 - 
 
 
Table 7a. Estimation Results: CES Utility Function, 1997 
 
Age -0.0032  -0.0003   
 (0.002)  (0.002)   
Age^2 0.0001 
***  0.0001  
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   
# of kids younger than 15  -0.0051 
***  -0.0044  
*** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)   
# of Specific dependent children  0.0115 
***  0.0108  
*** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)   
Junior high school  -0.0770   
*** 
 (0.004)   
2-year college  -0.0031   
 (0.005)   




***  1.0711 
***  0.7901  
*** 
 (0.017)  (0.047) (0.054)   
μ  0.0108 
*  -0.0793 
***  -0.1460  
*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)   
σ  0.3463 
***  0.3160 
***  0.2951  
*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)   
#  of  observation  73697 73697 73697   
Log  Likelihood  -74308.6 -73762.4 -73597.4   
(Note) Figures in parentheses show standard error. - 31 - 
 
Table 7b. Estimation Results: CES Utility Function, 2002 
 
Age -0.0084 
***  -0.0074  
*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Age^2 0.0002 
***  0.0002  
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
# of kids younger than 15  -0.0057 
***  -0.0053  
*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
# of Specific dependent children  0.0072 
**  0.0059  
** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Junior high school  -0.0782   
*** 
 (0.005) 
2-year college  -0.0006   
 (0.006) 
4-year college, graduate school  0.0031   
(0.004) 
Constant 1.1461 
***  1.0343 
***  0.9012  
*** 
 (0.015) (0.052) (0.055) 
μ  -0.0622 
***  -0.1143 
***  -0.1482  
*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
σ  0.3625 
***  0.3409 
***  0.3285  
*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
#  of  observation  63703 63703 63703   
Log  Likelihood  -69727.9 -69184.1 -69074.8   
(Note) Figures in parentheses show standard error. - 32 - 
Table 8. Elasticities, Income Effects: CES Utility Function 
   Average S.  D.  Min  max 
1997, without educational variables       
  η  0.138 0.034 0.061 0.343 
  φ  -0.790  0.056 -0.944 -0.473 
  ηc  0.928 0.057 0.609 1.154 
  κ  3.253 1.071 0.792  11.914 
1997, with educational variables       
  η  0.211 0.036 0.113 0.426 
  φ  -0.791  0.056 -0.952 -0.492 
  ηc  1.002 0.062 0.668 1.246 
  κ  2.666 0.824 0.725  10.469 
2002, without educational variables   
  η  0.157 0.027 0.100 0.269 
  φ  -0.790  0.010 -0.828 -0.768 
  ηc  0.947 0.027 0.879 1.066 
  κ  2.702 0.143 2.464 3.020 
2002, with educational variables   
  η  0.195 0.028 0.133 0.311 
  φ  -0.790  0.010 -0.838 -0.763 
  ηc  0.985 0.028 0.899 1.106 
  κ  2.446 0.146 2.050 2.782 
 - 33 - 
 
 
Table 9a. Estimation Results: CES Utility Function, 1997 
 Permanent
work    Supply 
work    Daily- 
workers   
Age -0.0049 
**  0.0263 0.0574   
** 
 (0.002) (0.050) (0.029) 
Age^2 0.0001 
***  -0.0004 -0.0006   
* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
# of kids younger than 15  -0.0049 
***  -0.0608 -0.0298   
 (0.002) (0.044) (0.025) 
# of Specific dependent children  0.0118 
***  -0.0562 -0.0800   
 (0.003) (0.082) (0.049) 
Constant 1.1650 
***  -0.1678 -1.0358   
* 
 (0.049) (1.055) (0.601) 
μ  -0.0603 
***  -0.3875 
***  -0.3890  
*** 
  (0.006) (0.085) (0.050) 
σ  0.3181 
***  0.4954 
***  0.3304  
*** 
 (0.002) (0.069) (0.029) 
# of observation  73275 170 252 
Log Likelihood  -72788.5  -281.6  -355.6   
η  0.119 0.568  0.585   
  (0.03) (0.07)  (0.06)   
φ  -0.791 -0.807  -0.807   
  (0.06) (0.12)  (0.08)   
ηc  0.910 1.375  1.392   
  (0.06) (0.17)  (0.12)   
(Note) Figures in parentheses show standard error. - 34 - 
 
Table 9b. Estimation Results: CES Utility Function, 2002 
Permanent
work    Supply 
work    Daily- 
workers   
Age -0.0111 
***  0.0387 -0.0021   
 (0.002) (0.390) (0.027) 
Age^2 0.0002 
***  0.0005 0.0001   
 (0.000) (-0.330) (0.000) 
# of kids younger than 15  -0.0058 
***  0.0343 -0.0112   
 (0.002) (-1.270) (0.024) 
# of Specific dependent children  0.0072 
**  0.0653 -0.0473   
 (0.003) (0.240) (0.040) 
Constant 1.1647 
***  0.8532 1.0722   
* 
 (0.054) (0.440) (0.564) 
μ  -0.0900 
***  0.0842 
***  -0.1064  
** 
  (0.006) (-2.840) (0.052) 
σ  0.3441 
***  0.0673 
***  0.3855  
*** 
 (0.002) (8.900) (0.027) 
# of observation  62887 405 411 
Log Likelihood  -67599.2  -697.0  -535.3   
η  0.131 0.275  0.119   
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)   
φ  -0.784 -0.805  -0.812   
  (0.06) (0.11)  (0.07)   
ηc  0.915 1.080  0.931   
  (0.06) (0.14)  (0.07)   
(Note) Figures in parentheses show standard error. - 35 - 
 
 















Age 0.0073  -0.0015  0.0004      -0.0065 
* 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)    (0.004)
Age^2 0.0000  0.0001 
***  0.0001     0.0002 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)
# of kids younger than 15  -0.0025  -0.0029  -0.0007      -0.0062 
** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)    (0.003)
# of Specific dependent children  -0.0005  0.0161 
***  0.0114     0.0099 
** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.011)    (0.005)
Constant 0.3536 
***  0.9726 
***  0.7553  
***  0.9170 
*** 
 (0.125) (0.081) (0.220)    (0.107)
μ  -0.1966 
***  -0.0982 
***  -0.1402  
***  -0.1546 
*** 
  (0.021) (0.014) (0.035)    (0.016)
σ  0.2923 
***  0.3075 
***  0.2907  
***  0.2899 
*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)    (0.005)
# of observation  10221 36061 4538    22877
Log Likelihood  -10569.2  -36225.1  -4446.3      -22311.2 
η  0.255 0.148 0.198      0.245 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)      (0.04) 
φ  -0.787 -0.795 -0.789     -0.786 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)      (0.06) 
ηc  1.042 0.943 0.987      1.031 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)      (0.06) 
(Note) Figures in parentheses show standard error. - 36 - 
 
 















Age 0.0003  -0.0076 
**  -0.0125     -0.0117 
*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)    (0.004)
Age^2 0.0001  0.0002 
***  0.0003  
***  0.0002 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)
# of kids younger than 15  -0.0069  -0.0048 
*  -0.0007     -0.0074 
** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)    (0.003)
# of Specific dependent children  0.0051  0.0110  0.0033      -0.0048 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.012)    (0.005)
Constant 0.4720 
***  1.0253 
***  0.9114  
***  0.9539 
*** 
 (0.149) (0.081) (0.195)    (0.101)
μ  -0.2016 
***  -0.1172 
***  -0.1634  
***  -0.1569 
*** 
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.025)    (0.011)
σ  0.3293 
***  0.3395 
***  0.3358  
***  0.3146 
*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.010)    (0.004)
# of observation  6716 30152 5073    21762
Log Likelihood  -7640.9  -33311.7    -5564.3    -22502.5 
η  0.240 0.149  0.205      0.225 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)      (0.03) 
φ  -0.781 -0.789  -0.780      -0.778 
  (0.07) (0.06)  (0.07)      (0.06) 
ηc  1.021 0.938  0.985      1.003 
  (0.08) (0.06)  (0.07)      (0.06) 
(Note) Figures in parentheses show standard error. - 37 - 
 
Table 11. Linear Labor Supply and CES Utility 
 CES  Linear  correlation 
η  0.1498 0.1040 0.6912 
  (0.026) (0.032)   
φ  -0.7907 -0.5116 -0.3024 
  (0.009) (0.151)   
ηc  0.9405 0.6156 0.5919 
  (0.026) (0.183)   
Predicted average tax rate  0.1764 0.1775 0.9982 
  (0.023) (0.023)   
Predicted marginal tax rate  0.2204 0.2234 0.9624 
  (0.037) (0.037)   
Predicted hours worked  1740.5 1777.0 0.9901 
  (84.647) (75.372)   
Predicted net wage rate  0.2046 0.2038 0.9989 
  (0.061) (0.060)   
 
(note) The figures based on the estimation results shown in Table 3 and 7, the case without 
educational backgrounds variables. The data used is of 2002. - 38 - 
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